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FICTION AND THE ONTOLOGICAL 
LANDSCAPE* 
THOMAS G. PAVEL 
Universite du Quebec a Montreal 
Towards the end of the XVIIIth century, a new cosmology was 
quite established in the European scientific milieux and was con- 
stantly conquering new social territories. Earlier, Fontenelle 
described the pleasure and amazement with which a narrow French 
elite came in touch with the recent astronomy. The Christian 
cosmology was far from dead, however. At the very end of the cen- 
tury, the enormous success of Haydn's oratorio, The Creation, an 
enthusiastic, open celebration of the old cosmology, cannot be at- 
tributed only to the beauty of the music. Indeed, in defiance of the 
musical conventions of the period, The Creation relates the music 
to the libretto in an almost literal way. Should one think that the 
public was enjoying the oratorio despite its cosmology or because 
of it? At least some of the contemporary admirers of Haydn must 
have heard of the new theories about the planets moving around 
the sun. They must have been peripherally aware of a certain 
cosmology, while keeping their central commitments to an entirely 
different one, similar to a child who at the age when it becomes 
more and more obvious that Santa Claus doesn't exist, still clings 
to his old beliefs, while marginally sensing that his convictions may 
be obsolete. 
Would thus the utter enjoyment of Haydn's Creation, libretto 
included,' represent a case of playful ontological regression? Could 
it be that, conversely, in other cases artistic fiction conveys on- 
tological anticipation? Think of the godless world of some of 
Marlowe's plays, or of the attributeless characters of Musil. 
It is clear from such examples that the referential framework 
posited by literary or more generally by artistic fiction does 
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not necessarily function by virtue of the ontological structure at- 
tributed to the actual world. On the contrary, in many cases, the 
ontology of fiction enters into complex conflictual relationships 
with actual ontologies. Our questions will be: how should we 
understand such conflicts? how are they solved? what are the con- 
sequences of these conflicts and their solutions for literary theory? 
II 
Usually, in the philosophical environment where discussions 
about what there is take place, the participants are crucially in- 
terested in eliminating superfluous entities and in working with on- 
ly one type of beings, the basic beings.' This remark applies to the 
realist philosopher as well as to the instrumentalist, to the hard- 
core actualist, as well as to the proponent of possible-worlds 
semantics. For, indeed, instrumentalism is an epistemological at- 
titude, casting little doubt about the ontological properties of 
things out there, questioning only our ability to grasp them 
realistically. As for the possible-worlds semanticist, his endeavor 
aims precisely at dispensing with the ontologically troublesome 
possible beings, which conveniently become actual-in-some- 
possible world. 
One attempt to break with this «reality fixation,» as Richard 
Rout ley appropriately calls it, is provided by Meinongian on- 
tology.' To every description there corresponds a being; some of 
these possess actual existence, while others, lacking actuality, sub- 
sist only. For the theory of fiction, the Meinongian point of view is 
most welcome. It accounts for a central intuition shared by users of 
natural language and fiction, namely that when we speak about 
some entity, we posit it as hypothetically being there in some on- 
tological space, the nature of which remains to be determined from 
case to case. «The best hockey player in the world,» «the longest 
sentence in English,» «the present king of France,» «the square cir- 
cle,» «God»-each of these expressions posits a being, whose actual 
existence may be checked later on, but whose subsistence in some 
kind of space we take for granted as soon as the expression is ut- 
tered and understood. In a Meinongian framework one may devise 
a metrics for measuring in each case the distance between actuality 
and the subsisting being, and elaborate about the nature of the 
subsistence-space of each expression. Thus, «the longest sentence 
in English» belongs to the non-actual physically impossible world 
where humans would live eternally and utter infinite sentences; 2




«the square circle» subsists in the non-actual logically impossible 
world where the entities can possess contradictory properties, and 
so on. 
Still, from the point of view of the theory of fiction, a 
Meinongian model does not go beyond a division of beings into two 
categories: actual and non-actual. In earlier papers, I have argued 
that in order to understand reference to mythological and fictional 
beings, ontologies making use of only one realm of actual entities 
are not sufficient.' In addition to mono-level ontologies, we may 
construct multi-level ontologies, describing worlds which include 
two or more layers of actual beings. Such an ontology, I have con- 
tended, is necessary for the representation of worlds pervaded by 
the sacred. As described by phenomenologists and historians of 
religion, these worlds share a clear-cut distinction between the 
realm of the sacred and the realm of the profane. In what follows, I 
shall elaborate on multi-level ontologies by examining the per- 
culiarities of reference to such worlds. I will then discuss the use of 
ontologies within human communities, ontological fermentation 
and development, decomposition and clashes, solutions such as 
cultural landscaping, reactions. Finally, I will examine the role of 
fictional ontologies within the ontological economy of a given 
culture. 
During the initiation ceremonies, the Kwakiutl neophyte 
describes the pole in the center of the worship house as follows: «I 
am in the Center of the World....I am next to the Pillar of the 
World.» The novice is not making the same type of attribution as a 
speaker who, sr eaking about Paris, describes it as «the capital of 
France.» The pole in the worship house it not a mere object fulfill- 
ing the function of «pillar of the World,» the way Paris plays the 
function of capital of France. Think instead of a Frenchman who, 
after Napoleon's defeat in 1815, would still refer to him as the 
emperor, in a sentence like 
(1) The emperor is prisoner at Saint-Helena. 
Now, the use of the expression 'the emperor' in (1) can be 
understood in at least two ways. First, it may be a referential use of 
a definite description, in Donnellan's sense.' According to Don- 
nellan, definite descriptions may be used effectively to refer to in- 
dividuals even if the properties denoted by these descriptions do not 
belong in the strictest sense to the individual. One may successfully 
refer to someone drinking vodka by the expression: «the man with 3
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the martini glass.» Similarly, «the emperor» may mean «the in- 
dividual» who until recently was the emperor of France.» Second, 
the expression «the emperor» can be used attributively, meaning 
«the unique being who exists and is an emperor of France and the 
only such emperor.» When used attributively, the expression 'the 
emperor' renders (1)false, since Napoleon resides at Saint-Helena 
precisely by virtue of having been deposed. However, the at- 
tributive reading has an interesting variant. Consider a devoted 
Bonapartist who utters (1); for him the meaning of the sentence 
would be something like: «the individual who in his own right and 
according to the best interests of France is the emperor, is, due to 
unfortunate circumstances, held prisoner at Saint-Helena.» For the 
Bonapartist, Napoleon's being the emperor of France is a state of 
affairs which belongs to the best possible course of the world. That 
Napoleon is held prisoner is an indication about the world's not 
having taken its best possible course. 
Reference to sacred objects or being via definite descriptions 
may equally be classified into these uses. An expression like 'the 
son of God' or 'the Messiah' may be used to refer to «the in- 
dividual Christians believe to be the son of God or the Messiah.» 
This is a referential use, which does not necessarily accept the truth 
of the predicates. For Christians, however, the expressions are used 
attributively: the predicate 'the son of God' is assumed to be true 
about Jesus. But notice that along with this assumption goes the 
conviction that the fact that Jesus is the son of God or the Messiah 
indicates that the world has taken its best possible course. Similar- 
ly, the Kwakiutl novice attributes to the pole the property of 'Pillar 
of the World' with the understanding that this is so in a very 
privileged course of the world. In a certain sense, the state of af- 
fairs in which the pole is the Pillar of the World is preferable to any 
state of affairs in which this is not the case. For the believers, the 
descriptions applied to sacred being and objects contain a reference 
to the optimal course of the world. Sacred being and objects satisfy 
the description in the best possible state of affairs, from the point 
of view of the believers. 
If this is so, if in the best course of the world the pole is the 
pillar of the world, what about the property pole displayed by the 
object? On the profane level, the pole is certainly a pole, but not 
just a pole. The attribute receives a supplementary connotation of 
«privileged, uncommon.» Due to the sacralization of the object, 
for both initiated and noninitiated people belonging to the com- 
munity, the pole of the worship house is not a pole like the others. 4




Accordingly, in situations where the distinction sacred- 
profane is present, one notices: 1. the establishment of a special 
relation of designation, the «best course of the world» designation, 
which denotes the sacred object as manifesting the presence of the 
sacred, and 2. the adding of the note «privileged, uncommon» to 
the usual attributes of the object, on the profane level. This note is 
present when sacred objects are talked about outside their proper 
religious function. The Holy Land is called 'holy' even outside 
purely religious contexts. The connotation of the term outside such 
contexts is «special, privileged, uncommon.» 
These two characteristics typically signal the presence of a two- 
level ontology, that is, of a complex structure wherein a given ob- 
ject belongs to two different sets of worlds, having in each of these 
different properties, functions and ontological weight. The worlds 
in which the individual called Jesus, the pole of the worship house, 
the grotto at Lourdes exist, but are clearly different from the 
worlds inhabited by the son of God, the Pole of the World, and the 
Holy Virgin. Interestingly, this difference is there not only for the 
skeptic and the materialist, but also for the believer, who often 
perceives the world as profane in its texture, but sanctified by the 
epiphany of the holy manifesting itself precisely in these «privileg- 
ed, uncommon» places, the holy spaces where channels open bet- 
ween the two worlds. Sacred beings, holy objects, miraculous or 
prophetic grottoes, holy mountains, places of worship, all these 
provide for the articulation points where the two worlds meet, in 
what one could call an ontological fusion. 
By this term I understand a two-level ontology possessing a set 
of entities which belong to both levels. It is certainly conceivable 
that a fusion be complete, in the sense that all the entities of one 
level play a role at the other level. Think of esoteric doctrines 
teaching universal symbolism. Within such doctrines, virtually each 
object belonging to the literal world has a place in the ontological 
framework of a secondary, symbolic world. Under such a view, the 
task of the wise is to decipher the place occupied within the hidden 
real world by the objects perceived in the world of appearance. 
Pushed to the limits, every major religion is a project of complete 
ontological fusion. The presence of the holy converts the entire 
universe by attributing to each of its parts a religious meaning. 
Similarly, scientific projects are often based on complete fusions. 
Atomic physics posits an invisible level of reality coextensive with 
the world of everyday experience, but structurally different from it. 
On the other hand, partial ontological fusions are equally fre- 5
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quent. The manifestation of the sacred doesn't always take a pan- 
cosmic character. Most social organizations tend to limit the expan- 
sion of the sacred. When they succeed, the fusion points between 
the two ontologies are restricted to the sacred space (temples, wor- 
ship houses, places of sacrifice), to the sacred objects, and to the 
celebration periods (ceremonies, feasts, festivals). The remaining 
space and time, the non-holy objects and activities obey only the 
laws and constraints of the profane world. 
The world view of a given community may thus divide into 
several ontological landscapes. We shall characterize an ontological 
landscape as an ontology or an ontological fusion which governs a 
domain of the collective life. We speak of collective life in order to 
emphasize the role of the users of ontologies as human com- 
munities in particular socio-historical contexts. The notion of on- 
tological landscape is designed to stress the fact that various com- 
munities make different uses of ontologies. Thus, European society 
at the end of the XVIIIth century was still keeping the Christian 
landscape as an essential element of its ontological territory. This 
territory was however much wider than the Christian ontology:even 
among those not primarily interested in the progress of science the 
rumor circulated that new and disturbing cosmological theories 
were being proposed. We might assume safely that most of 
Haydn's admirers never managed to study closely the new 
cosmology. However, any educated person of the XVIIIth century 
could have planned to acquaint the new cosmology, the existence of 
which, together with some general characteristic, was common 
knowledge. Nonetheless, despite these new territories, it was still 
possible to celebrate the beauty of the land which stayed for cen- 
turies at the center of civilization. The enthusiasm with which 
Haydn's Creation was received cannot be explained otherwise. The 
oratorio must have been perceived as a magnificent opportunity to 
explore the old ontology, so beautiful, so close at hand, so reassur- 
ing. 
III 
Conversely, one may easily think of a situation where, after 
having lived for a long time around an ontological fortress, a cer- 
tain population starts to spread around on a much wider surface. 
The steep rock, by now uninhabitable, on which the founders had 
built the impregnable castle, is declared a historic park; its only use 
is as a tourist attraction. However, in a certain sense, this castle 6




may serve as center and emblem for the expanding region. Doesn't 
geocentric cosmology play a similar role in our time? 
The image suggested by the preceding remarks is that of an on- 
tological pluralism, whereby the users of ontologies have a choice 
between several ontological landscapes. In fact, however, the 
freedom of choice appears to be subject to some constraints. In 
most periods, people have a rather deep and stable feeling that they 
live in an ontologically coherent world. If most societies seem to ac- 
commodate or at least to authorize some diversity in the on- 
tological landscapes, there are, however, means to indicate that on- 
ly one of these landscapes represents the ontology proper, or cen- 
tral. Neighbouring ontologies always lead to a process of on- 
tological focalization, to a sorting out, to an ordering of the on- 
tologies in place by the assignment to each of an importance index. 
The most important ontology may then play the role of absolute 
norm, of a high court which summons neighbouring ontologies for 
control and justification. In communities which adopt a certain 
sacred ontological fusion as their central ontology, while still keep- 
ing other peripheral models, the chosen sacred ontology would 
serve as ultimate truth and regulating principle for the remaining 
models. When conflicts arise, the peripheral ontologies have to 
yield. In typical European villages, for instance, popular beliefs in 
local spirits, witchcraft, etc., coexisted with the new system; even if 
they were tolerated at the periphery, the slightest danger of expan- 
sion or conflict was severely repressed. 
Seen from this angle, orthodoxy wasn't as much the defense of 
a single ontology as the protection of a certain ontological focaliza- 
tion, of a certain ordering of neighbouring ontologies. But, when 
one observes the large number of beliefs and heresies condemned in 
the name of one focalization or another, one cannot avoid the im- 
pression that ontologies are in a continuous state of fermentation, 
change and degradation, in a permanent movement, against which 
the only defense is the dogmatic reinforcement of a certain 
focalization. Thus, rigidity in the religious organization, 
dogmatism of any sort, probably have their origin in the need for 
stability and occasional normalization of the ontological land- 
scape. Enforcing ontological stability is one of the most important 
tasks of religious, intellectual and artistic super-structures. 
Now, the patterns of ontological organization seem to reduce 
to a few current types. Central ontologies may vary between two 
extremes: fusions and literal ontologies. We saw that a fusion is a 
two-level ontology in which every element of one level plays a role 7
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at the other level as well. A literal ontology is a one level construc- 
tion; it assumes it represents faithfully all and only what there is. 
Both fusions and literal ontologies may be in turn strong or weak. 
A strong literal ontology claims to be the only faithful representa- 
tion of all and only what there is. An example of strong literal on- 
tology is the hard-core positivism, especially in its earlier versions. 
A weak literal ontology may coexist with other weak literal on- 
tologies or even with other fusions: a more tolerant philosophy of 
science can thus accept more than one literal representation of what 
there is. It can even accommodate religious representations of the 
world. 
At the other end of the spectrum, within strong fusions, the 
sacred ontology tends to cover the whole surface of the profane 
one, as may be the case in the wholly sacralized world of archaic 
communities. In weaker fusions, the two levels come in touch with 
one another only selectively. The educated Christian of the end of 
the XIXth century believed in a universe governed by natural laws: 
the sacred ontology retracted to a few isolated points, where the ho- 
ly timidly inserted itself into an entirely foreign texture. Religiously 
oriented philosophy solves this encircling either by withdrawing in- 
to the existential moral field, since, according to this choice, the 
true place of the sacred is in the interiority of the subject, or by 
positing a sacred center of the world, non-affected by the progress 
of the profane. In both cases, in the heart of the literal we face the 
epiphany of a metaphor: the unseen, donor of meaning. 
Turning now to the peripheral ontologies, we see they fulfill 
two functions which may be compared to leisure and sports. 
Leisure ontologies, or ontologies for pleasure, derive in most cases 
from older, discarded ontologies. Each culture has its ontological 
ruins, its historical parks, where the members of the community 
relax and contemplate ontological relics. Greek and Roman gods 
performed this function till late in the history of European culture. 
On the other hand, marginal ontologies may be used as training 
grounds for different ontological tasks. Thus, one of the functions 
of literary, and more generally, of artistic fiction is to train the 
members of the community in such abilities as rapid induction, 
construction of hypotheses, positing of possible worlds, etc. 
Communities appear to more or less consciously arrange their 
ontological space according to principles of landscape architecture, 
or rather of ontological urban planning. Strong fusions may be 
compared to the use of natural landscape by communities where 
life is still close to nature. Weak fusions resemble XIXth century 8




cities, where the inhabited space was clearly separated from green 
spaces, to the extent that city dwellers lived and breathed in dif- 
ferent places. Strong literal ontologies eliminate landscape variety, 
similar to the futuristic city from which the vegetal realm would 
have been excluded. Finally, weak literal ontologies may be com- 
pared to our contemporary chaotic cities with their heterogeneous 
neighbourhoods scattered around, linked only by highway net- 
works. 
Thus, ontological planning aims to avoid or at least appease 
the open conflict between different ontologies. It rationalizes to 
some extent the irrationality of the ontological space; as a conse- 
quence, such questions as «is proposition p true or false?» can be 
relativized to such and such an area of the general landscape. At the 
beginning of our century, a proposition like «Christ is a man-god,» 
the truth of which was unquestionably at the center of a strong fu- 
sion such as XIIIth century philosophy, remained true within the 
space arranged for this kind of sentence, without however being 
true everywhere in the ontological landscape, just as the activity of 
breathing fresh air, which at some point in human history was 
coextensive with most human activities, became restricted for the 
dwellers of the modern megalopolis to certain times and places. 
And similar to the social rules of behaviour which prescribe 
special leisure activities dedicated to the periodical consumption of 
fresh air, there exists in complex ontological landscapes a sort of on- 
tological rules of etiquette which indicate in some detail which pro- 
positions should be assented to in various contexts and situations. 
Thus, the propositions which are obviously true in Church on Sun- 
day morning, are impolitely so in different contexts, such as, say, 
professional meetings. 
Notice also that ontological planning may trigger hostile reac- 
tions. There is, indeed, a certain cultural condition which may be 
called ontological stress. Caused by difficulties of orientation 
among the complexities of modern ontological arrangements, this 
type of stress leads to the weakening of our adjustment to on- 
tological landscapes. Its first patient was Don Quixote, unable to 
tell apart actuality from fiction. In our time the ontological distinc- 
tions became much more subtle and complex. The modern city 
dweller travels long distances between the places where he works, 
and those where he lives and relaxes. Likewise, the user of complex 
ontological arrangements has to travel between heterogeneous, if 
not plainly hostile landscapes, to which he is expected to adjust 
rapidly and for short periods of time. The worlds of our Churches, 9
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of our political parties, of our psychological counsellors, of our 
various sets of friends can considerably vary in their inventories of 
beings. Our capability for ontological adaptation cannot tolerate 
more than a certain amount of change. When the threshold is 
reached, there come reactions, interestingly similar to the reactions 
vis-à-vis the pressure of modern city-life. 
These vary between two limits: anarchism and passeism. On- 
tological anarchism interprets the changes from one landscape to 
another as indicating a complete absence of ontological order. To 
the ontological anarchist, each landscape is only the deceitful 
ossification of one kind of illusion. Each ontological perspective is 
considered by the anarchist from the point of view of its 
unavoidable negation. To establish oneself somewhere, to dwell in 
one of the ontologies, constitutes for the anarchist the most serious 
error. Paul Feyerabend's epistemological stance is the most ar- 
ticulate expression of ontological anarchism.' 
Conversely, the passeist deplores old times when ontological 
stability was still there. Nostalgics of different persuasions, craving 
for the age of innocence, for the age of cathedrals, or for any other 
similar past projection of their anxieties, are attracted by what they 
perceive as the simplicity of assent these periods asked for. 
IV 
The anarchist assumes that the simultaneous presence of 
several types of ontological landscapes cancels the credibility of 
each ontology. Their multiplicity proves that they are all fictitious. 
Choice between these fictions is made according to purely 
utilitarian criteria. Any ontology is good, provided it serves a cer- 
tain purpose; marginal or obsolete landscapes have the same right 
as central ontologies. In turn, by rejecting ontological multiplicity, 
the passeist, in his own way, considers the surrounding ontologies 
as mere fictions, at least in comparison with the overthrown 
dogma. 
Now, the term 'fiction' is used in the last few sentences in a 
special way, as synonymous with `error.' Users of ontologies 
however, spontaneously make the distinctions between fiction and 
error on the one hand and between fiction and truth on the other. 
In the light of the previous considerations, this last distinction 
shouldn't be understood as radically opposing some entirely true 
ontology to its false alternatives. Especially, this distinction 
shouldn't be interpreted as opposing rationalist-scientific on- 10




tologies to religious ones. Indeed, for the homo religiosus, myth 
represents absolute truth; moreover, many modern users adhere to 
both packages of religious and scientific propositions. Today, it is 
not difficult to find individuals or groups equally assenting to 
«Christ is both man and God» and to «the Earth moves around the 
Sun.» However, at least within a certain normality, it is impossible 
to believe in the same way these two sentences and «Sherlock 
Holmes lives on Baker Street.» To deny the divinity of Jesus or the 
movement of the planets around the sun means to propose a new 
arrangement of the ontological landscape by disrupting the 
organization of the sacred or of the established ontology. To deny 
the existence of Sherlock Holmes, however, doesn't affect the on- 
tological territory. Holmes is there in order not to exist. 
V 
Our discussion pointed out to the considerable variety and 
fermentation of ontologies. Changes occur, conflict arises, solu- 
tions have to be made up. The notions of ontological landscaping 
and ontological planning were proposed as sketchy representations 
of the ways ontological conflict is kept under control. I also stress- 
ed that fiction is not coextensive with non-literal ontologies. What 
then is fiction? 
One way of approaching the question is by examining the use 
of fictional ontologies. It appears indeed that ontologies can have 
more than one series of users. Let us call the people for whose 
needs an ontology is devised, its primary users. Due to various 
cases, a given ontology may cease to be assented to by its primary 
users, thus losing its truth. This does not necessarily mean that the 
whole construction, the entities, their properties, their history, etc. 
are irrevocably discarded. A deposed ontology may find its secon- 
dary users, who would employ it as fiction. Mythologies survive 
this way. Nelson Goodman once suggested that we should replace 
the question «what is art?» by «when is art?». 8 Likewise, one might 
be tempted to just ask «when is fiction?» and to answer along the 
above-suggested lines: «fiction is when discarded ontologies find 
secondary users.» But, correct as this answer may be for situations 
such as the one mentioned, it still misses an important part of the 
picture. 
For, if fiction were only a special use of ontologies produced 
elsewhere and later abandoned as obsolete, how could one explain 
the striking fact that as far as we know most societies maintain 11
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some sort of non-religious fictional activites, such as the «laughing 
stories» of the Cherokees, fables, anecdotes, etc. To derive these 
from older disused or degraded myths is not always easy: on the 
contrary, many folk-stories are just nonmythical stuff, rooted in 
the observation of current social life, customs, etc. These fictional 
constructions appear to have been designed independently of on- 
tologies whose purpose and use drastically changed over the cen- 
turies. 
A possible solution to this puzzle would appeal to the notion 
of ontological landscaping and planning. We saw that an on- 
tological focalization organizes the beliefs of a community around 
a central ontology. Peripheral ontologies can coexist with the cen- 
tral ones, and serve as play or training grounds for the members of 
the group. Now, if we take the division of the ontological space in- 
to central vs. peripheral ontologies as a very general formal 
organization of the beliefs of a community, we may localize fiction 
in the ontological space as a peripheral region used for ludic and in- 
structional purposes. The concrete content of the marginal on- 
tology counts less than its position within the formal organization: 
fictional space can accommodate almost any ontological construc- 
tion. Seen this way, fiction is both a pragmatic and a semantic no- 
tion: the organization of the ontological space has certainly 
pragmatic reasons, but the structure itself is clearly semantic. Also, 
what kind of ontology will fill the fictional space is a pragmatic 
question: will it be a specially constructed ontology? an old, 
discarded one? an actual one used fictionally for a short time? But 
the regularities of the peripheral space itself are of a semantic 
nature.' 
Notice also that in pre-modern societies the veritable activity 
of the imagination is found in religious and mythological creation. 
The beings and universes invented by the archaic non-religious fic- 
tion certainly cannot measure with the luxuriant ontological crea- 
tion of the myth-makers. Conversely, in modern societies religious 
imagination seems to have to a large extent dried up, while fiction 
covers vast and diverse territories. Today, past mythologies, past 
scientific theories, past and present literary works, sub-literature, 
etc. can all be used fictionally. Thus, religious and mythological 
richness seems to be compatible with fictional poverty, while fic- 
tional fertility may correspond to a shortage of religious and 
mythological imagination." 
The picture may not be so simple: one has to consider also that 
advances in scientific imagination clearly play a role in the shrink- 12




ing of the religious ontological production. It seems however 
reasonable to suggest that the creation of nonempirical entities is to 
some extent regulated by what one may call the economy of the im- 
aginary, which controls the total amount of idols and fictions used 
by a society. 
VI 
What are the consequences of the above proposals for the 
theory of literary fiction? 
First, ontological landscaping suggests that there is more than 
one kind of existence; conversely, there must be more than one 
kind of non-existence. Sherlock Holmes didn't exist, for sure, but 
London did and still does." We saw that double-level ontologies 
called weak fusions are characterized by the independent existence 
of a sacred and a profane level, which come in touch with one 
another in a few privileged spots. But this seems to be precisely the 
model of fictional ontologies: the fictional level and the level of the 
«actual-in-the-world» inevitably overlap in some crucial aspects. 
Reality takes part in or is reinterpreted by or is converted by fiction 
just as within ontological fusions the profane takes part in or is 
reinterpreted by or is converted by the sacred. To submit this does 
not amount to an identification of fiction and the sacred: we merely 
point to a similarity in their formal ontological structure. 
Differences are still considerable; they deserve further explora- 
tion. Here are a few suggestions: religious ontologies propose a 
model of the world which is fundamentally divided, while fictional 
constructions, once granted the willing suspension of disbelief, 
generally propose unitary models. The ontological cut in fiction 
cannot be seen except from outside. A further difference originates 
in the ludic character of fictional ontologies. Worth being discussed 
also is the relative complexity of religious constructions as opposed 
to the relative simplicity of fictional ontologies. 
Further, the above remarks may stimulate reflections on the 
functions of fiction. Tentatively, it may be suggested that within a 
more general economy of the imaginary fiction plays several func- 
tions in turn, according to the relative development of religious im- 
agination. Thus, in societies with a rich religious ontology, fiction 
may play a secondary role within the overall imagination activity. 
With the gradual simplification of religious constructions, the ter- 
ritory of fiction becomes more and more crowded. It may harbour 
discarded ontologies, and function as a privileged peripheral area 13
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in the complex ontological landscape, providing for both leisure 
and training space. 
Such reflections can be continued and refined. Are religious 
and fictional ontologies meant only to be cult and respectively ludic 
objects, or are they supposed to offer, at least to some extent, ex- 
planatory models of the world? If so, what are the similarities and 
the differences between them? Is fiction only proposing substantive 
explanatory models of the world, or does it rather contribute to our 
basic training in constructing such models? If the answer is yes, 
how is this done and in how many ways? What would be the role of 
fiction in an entirely desacralized world? Can fictional ontologies 
be dangerous? In what way? These are a few among the questions 
my above proposals could lead us to confront. 
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